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I. INTRODUCTION
In January 2014, the retailer Neiman Marcus revealed it was the target of a
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data breach affecting over one million customers’ credit and debit cards.1
Hackers had installed malware on payment terminals and stole customers’
payment card information over a two-and-a-half month period.2 Investigators
found fraudulent usage on thousands of credit and debit cards accessed in the
breach.3
In March 2014, Hilary Remijas, an affected Neiman Marcus customer, sued
the retailer in a class action lawsuit over the data breach. 4 The complaint’s
allegations included breach of implied contract and violation of data breach
laws.5 Their alleged harm included fraudulent charges, the increased risk of
identity theft due to the exposure of their private information, and time spent
monitoring financial accounts to watch for potential identity theft. 6
A federal district judge dismissed the lawsuit in 2014 for lack of Article III
standing.7 However, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and
held the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged standing. 8 The Seventh Circuit found the
increased risk of identity theft and the time and effort to protect against that risk
conferred standing. 9 With the lawsuit allowed to continue, Neiman Marcus
ultimately settled for 1.6 million dollars in 2017. 10
The grocery store chain SuperValu faced a similar situation to Neiman
Marcus when a hacker broke into the chain’s databases and stole customers’
payment card information. 11 Similar to Remijas, affected SuperValu customers
brought class action suits alleging tort and contract claims and violation of state
consumer protection and data breach notification laws. 12 Also like Remijas, the
plaintiffs claimed they faced an increased risk of identity theft necessitating
measures to guard against that risk, including monitoring financial accounts to
look for possible identity theft. 13 The district court, in that case, dismissed the
plaintiffs’ claims finding no injury to support standing. 14

1. Elizabeth A. Harris, Nicole Perlroth & Nathaniel Popper, Neiman Marcus Data Breach Worse Than
First Said, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/24/business/neiman-marcus-breachaffected-1-1-million-cards.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Suevon Lee, Neiman Marcus to Pay $1.6M in Shopper Data Breach Suit, LAW360 (Mar. 17, 2017),
https://www.law360.com/articles/903573/neiman-marcus-to-pay-1-6m-in-shopper-data-breach-suit (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review).
5. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 690–91 (7th Cir. 2015).
6. Id. at 692.
7. Id. at 691.
8. Id. at 697.
9. Id. at 693, 696.
10. Lee, supra note 4.
11. In re SuperValu, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 870 F.3d 763, 766 (8th Cir. 2017).
12. Id. at 767.
13. Id. at 769, 771.
14. Id. at 767.
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On appeal, the Eighth Circuit found the plaintiffs’ risk of future harm
insufficient to confer standing. 15 The court looked to a government report on
identity theft, which found the vast majority of data breaches do not lead to
identity theft or fraud. 16 Based on the report, the court found it unlikely plaintiffs
would suffer payment card fraud and therefore the risk of future harm was
inadequate for standing. 17 The court also held the costs expended guarding
against fraud insufficient because safeguarding against a speculative threat does
not confer standing. 18
The Neiman Marcus and SuperValu data breaches are examples of data
breaches over the past decade that have affected millions of Americans. 19 With
data breaches on the rise, the number of consumers affected will likely increase.20
The type of information stolen varies; some data breaches affect credit card and
debit card information, 21 others involve more sensitive information, such as
Social Security numbers or medical histories.22 Additionally, while some of these
breaches affect national retailers, 23 hackers also target small businesses, 24 which
may present an easier target because of lesser data protection safeguards. 25 The
consequences of any breach vary, but can include fraudulent payment card usage

15. Id. at 771.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Jia Lynn Yang & Amrita Jayakumar, Target Says Up to 70 Million More Customers Were Hit by
December Data Breach, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/targ
et-says-70-million-customers-were-hit-by-dec-data-breach-more-than-first-reported/2014/01/10/0ada1026-79fe11e3-8963-b4b654bcc9b2_story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining the
data breach affecting Target in which hackers stole the credit card and debit card information of up to 40
million customers); Tara Siegal Bernard et al., Equifax Says Cyberattack May Have Affected 143 Million in the
U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/business/equifax-cyberattack.html (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (detailing the Equifax cyberattack in which hackers
accessed “data that potentially compromised sensitive information for 143 million American consumers”).
20. See Data Breaches in U.S. Allegedly Increasing at Record Pace, BLOOMBERG BNA (July 24, 2017),
https://www.bna.com/data-breaches-us-b73014462190/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(noting 29 percent in data breaches in the first half of 2017 compared to the first half of 2016).
21. Yang & Jayakumar, supra note 19.
22. Siegal Bernard et al., supra note 19.
23. Nandita Bose, Home Depot Confirms Security Breach Following Target Data Theft, REUTERS (Sept.
8, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-home-depot-databreach/home-depot-confirms-security-breachfollowing-target-data-theft-idUSKBN0H327E20140909 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
24. E. Scott Reckard & Tiffany Hsu, Small Businesses at High Risk for Data Breach, L.A. TIMES (July 4,
2014), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-small-data-breaches-20140705-story.html (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
25. Steve Strauss, Cyber Threat Is Huge for Small Businesses, USA TODAY (Oct. 20, 2017),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/columnist/strauss/2017/10/20/cyber-threat-huge-smallbusinesses/782716001/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“90% of small businesses [do
not] use data protection”).
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and identity theft. 26
These data breaches frequently lead to lawsuits. 27 While Remijas and the
affected Neiman Marcus customers successfully brought their claims in federal
court and ultimately reached a settlement, had the case been filed in another
circuit, the result could be different.28 Circuits are split with one side adopting the
Seventh Circuit’s approach in Remijas and the other adhering to the Eighth
Circuit’s reasoning in SuperValu.29
Although the Supreme Court issued a 2016 decision discussing the injury
requirement of standing, the ruling in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins failed to resolve the
circuit split.30 In 2017 alone, the D.C. Circuit found the increased risk of identity
theft due to data breaches constituted a sufficient injury for standing, but the
Fourth and Eighth Circuits held that risk insufficient. 31
This Comment argues the Supreme Court should adopt the approach used by
the Courts of Appeals finding standing.32 Alternatively, Congress could resolve
the data breach standing issue by narrowly crafting a statute recognizing a
person’s interest in their personally identifiable information and the harm a data
breach poses to that interest. 33 Part II discusses the Article III standing
requirements in the United States Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme
Court and how federal courts applied these rules to data breach cases before

26. Adam Shell, Equifax Data Breach Could Create Lifelong Identity Theft Threat, USA TODAY (Sept.
9, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/09/09/equifax-data-breach-could-create-life-long-identit
y-theft-threat/646765001/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
27. See Lawsuits Against Equifax Pile Up After Massive Data Breach, REUTERS (Sept. 11, 2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-equifax-cyber-lawsuits/lawsuits-against-equifax-pile-up-after-massive-databreach-idUSKCN1BM2E3 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting the filing of more
than 30 lawsuits against Equifax in the wake of the Equifax data breach).
28. See Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 276 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding a breach of personally
identifiable information stemming from theft of a medical center’s laptop did not give rise to standing); Whalen
v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 F. App’x 89, 90–91 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding a breach of credit card and debit card
information leading to alleged fraudulent usage did not give rise to standing).
29. Edward R. McNicholas & Grady Nye, D.C. Circuit Widens the Split on Standing in Data Breach
Cases After Spokeo, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=7335a9492364-4f44-9c2a-74939d5ea1da (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). The Sixth, Seventh,
Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have found standing in these cases, but the Second, Third, Fourth, and
Eighth have not. Dominic Spinelli, Data Breach Standing: Recent Decisions Show Growing Circuit Court Split,
AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice_serie
s/data_breach_standing_recent_decisions_show_gowing_circuit_court_split.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2018)
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); infra Part II; infra Part IV.
30. McNicholas & Nye, supra note 29.
31. Andrew C. Glass, David D. Christensen & Matthew N. Love, Data Breach Doubleheader: The
Eighth Circuit Issues Two Decisions Addressing Boundaries of Standing in Data Breach Class Actions, K&L
GATES (Oct. 9, 2017), http://www.klgates.com/data-breach-doubleheader-the-eighth-circuit-issues-two-decision
s-addressing-boundaries-of-standing-in-data-breach-class-actions-10-09-2017/ (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review).
32. Infra Part IV.
33. Infra Part V.
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Clapper v. Amnesty International.34 Part III discusses two recent Supreme Court
decisions regarding standing, Clapper and Spokeo.35 Part IV discusses the
growing circuit split concerning data breach standing and contends finding the
future risk of harm sufficient is the better approach that the Supreme Court
should adopt.36 In the alternative, Part V proposes a law to resolve the circuit
split and discusses the advantages of a statutory solution. 37 Either a Supreme
Court ruling or a statutory solution can resolve this circuit split and bring
certainty to the standing determination in data breach cases. 38
II. ARTICLE III STANDING AND PRE-CLAPPER STANDING IN DATA BREACH
CASES
Article III of the United States Constitution restricts federal courts to
deciding “Cases” and “Controversies.”39 This restriction ensures the judicial
branch of the federal government does not overstep its constitutional bounds by
taking over powers of the legislative and executive branches. 40 To fall within the
jurisdiction granted to the federal courts by the Constitution, a plaintiff must have
standing.41 Standing shows the plaintiff has a stake in the matter warranting the
federal courts’ jurisdiction. 42
To demonstrate standing, the plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) an
injury showing an “invasion of a legally protected interest”; (2) a causal link
between the injury and the alleged conduct of the defendant; and (3) the injury is
“redressab[able] by a favorable decision.” 43 Additionally, the injury cannot be
indefinite.44 It must be “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not
34. Infra Part II. Clapper v. Amnesty International was a Supreme Court decision regarding injury-in-fact
and the case had a significant effect on data breach litigation. 568 U.S. 398 (2013); Rebecca J. Schwartz, New
U.S. Supreme Court Decision Will Likely Impact Data Breach Litigation, DATA SEC. L. J. (Mar. 7, 2013),
https://www.datasecuritylawjournal.com/2013/03/07/new-u-s-supreme-court-decision-will-likely-impact-databreach-litigation/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting Clapper confirmed the high
bar for finding standing on the basis of increased risk of harm in data breach cases).
35. Infra Part III.
36. Infra Part IV.
37. Infra Part V. While previous scholarship has discussed statutory solutions to the data breach circuit
split, it has not given the language of a proposed statute. E.g. Patrick J. Lorio, Note, Access Denied: Data
Breach Litigation, Article III Standing, and a Proposed Statutory Solution, 51 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 79,
117 (2017) (discussing a statutory solution to the data breach circuit split, but not proposing specific statutory
language).
38. Infra Parts IV, V.
39. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
40. DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006) (citing Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818
(1997)) (“[N]o principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than
the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.”).
41. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009).
42. Id.
43. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
44. Id. at 574 (citing Mass. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488–89 (1923)).
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conjectural or hypothetical.”45 The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing
standing.46 Lack of standing means federal courts do not have subject matter
jurisdiction over the case. 47
Data breach cases present a unique problem for plaintiffs attempting to
establish standing.48 While affected companies or organizations often come
forward and reveal data breaches before a plaintiff files a lawsuit,49 stolen
information is not always used maliciously.50 Because of this uncertainty, people
affected by a data breach may have difficulty demonstrating their injury is
“concrete” and “actual or imminent.” 51
Even before the Clapper decision, in which the Supreme Court narrowed its
standard for future injuries and standing, 52 federal courts diverged in finding
standing for data breaches.53 Section A discusses pre-Clapper data breach cases
and the courts’ reasoning to find standing.54 Section B discusses pre-Clapper data
breach cases that did not find standing and explains why the courts reached those
decisions.55
A. Pre-Clapper Data Breach Cases Finding Standing
In Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp, the Seventh Circuit held the threat of
future harm relating to a data breach was a sufficient injury to establish
standing.56 Old National Bancorp ran a website where customers could submit

45. Id. at 560.
46. DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006).
47. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617
(1973)) (“A federal court’s jurisdiction therefore can be invoked only when the plaintiff himself has suffered
‘some threatened or actual injury.’”).
48. See Robert D. Fram, Simon J. Frankel & Amanda C. Lynch, Standing in Data Breach Cases: A
Review of Recent Trends, BLOOMBERG BNA (Nov. 9, 2015), https://www.bna.com/standing-data-breachn57982063308/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting defense attorneys have had
success dismissing data breach cases because of plaintiffs’ lack of actual harm to grant standing).
49. See Staples Says Security Breach May Have Affected 1.16 Million Cards, REUTERS (Dec. 19, 2014),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-staples-cybersecurity/staples-says-security-breach-may-have-affected-1-16million-cards-idUSKBN0JX2CY20141219 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining
Staples’ admission it was subject to a data breach in which credit card and debit card information may have
been accessed).
50. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, IDENTITY THEFT SERVICES: SERVICES OFFER SOME
BENEFITS BUT ARE LIMITED IN PREVENTING FRAUD 3 (Mar. 2017), available at
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/683842.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting
“data breaches do not necessarily result in identity theft”).
51. See id.
52. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013).
53. Bradford C. Mank, Data Breaches, Identity Theft, and Article III Standing: Will the Supreme Court
Resolve the Split in the Circuits?, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1323, 1336–43 (2017).
54. Infra Part II.A.
55. Infra Part II.B.
56. Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007).
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applications for banking services, an action requiring entering personal
information.57 A hacker breached the website and accessed sensitive customer
information.58 Affected individuals brought a class action suit against Old
National Bancorp and the servicer of the website, NCR Corporation, for
negligence and breach of contract claims.59 The plaintiffs alleged emotional
distress and potential economic damages. 60 NCR successfully moved to dismiss
the claims against it and Old National Bancorp moved for judgment on the
pleadings.61
The district court granted the motion finding a lack of “cognizable injury.” 62
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit turned to other circuit court decisions. 63 For
example, the court pointed to Sutton v. St. Jude Medical S. C., Inc. where the
Sixth Circuit held the increased risk of future health complications stemming
from a defective medical device created standing. 64 Finding these toxic exposure
and defective medical device cases sufficiently analogous, the Pisciotta court
held the threat of future harm was enough of an injury to confer standing. 65
Similar to Pisciotta, in Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., the Ninth Circuit held
the higher risk of identity theft stemming from a data breach was a sufficient
injury to confer standing. 66 In Krottner, an unknown thief stole a Starbucks
laptop containing personally identifiable information from nearly one hundred
thousand Starbucks employees. 67 Affected Starbucks employees filed class action
lawsuits against Starbucks, claiming negligence and breach of implied contract. 68
These plaintiffs alleged harm in the form of increased risk of identity theft and
one class representative alleged an injury of anxiety and stress due to the laptop
theft.69
The district court in Krottner found the plaintiffs established Article III
standing.70 The Ninth Circuit affirmed and found the anxiety and stress injury
was sufficient to confer standing before turning to the other alleged harm. 71 The
court stated increased risk of identity theft was a “credible threat of real and

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 631.
Id. at 632.
Id.
Id.
Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 632.
Id.
Id. at 634.
Id. at 634 n.3; Sutton v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 419 F.3d 568, 574–75 (6th Cir. 2005).
Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 634.
Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1140.
Id. at 1141.
Id. at 1142.
Id. at 1141.
Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1142.
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immediate harm” that was not “conjectural or hypothetical.” 72 In reaching this
conclusion, the Ninth Circuit examined its prior decisions allowing future harm
to confer standing in environmental claims. 73
Then the court looked at other Courts of Appeals, specifically the Sixth and
Seventh Circuits.74 Viewing favorably the Seventh Circuit’s holding that future
harm can confer standing in Pisciotta,75 the Ninth Circuit held the affected
Starbucks employees had standing due to the risk of future identity theft. 76
Despite multiple circuit courts finding standing in data breach litigation, other
courts reached the opposite conclusion. 77
B. Pre-Clapper Data Breach Cases Not Finding Standing
In Amburgy v. Express Scripts, Inc., the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri found the increased possibility of identity theft
insufficient for standing purposes despite a data breach. 78 There, a hacker
infiltrated Express Scripts’ database and accessed personal information before
threatening to make the information public. 79 John Amburgy, an affected
individual, brought a class action lawsuit against Express Scripts alleging
negligence, contract violations, and other state law violations. 80 Like the Pisciotta
and Krottner plaintiffs, Amburgy alleged an increased risk of fraud and crime
after the breach, as well as damages for the time and money spent protecting
against potential crimes.81 Express Scripts then moved to dismiss the case,
claiming the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction because Amburgy did
not have standing. 82
After reviewing the requirements for standing, the court noted the federal
courts were split in finding the future risk of identity theft sufficient for
standing.83 The court addressed Pisciotta’s holding that found standing, but it
expressed reluctance to follow a “recent trend” given standing’s constitutional
basis.84 Turning to the plaintiff’s allegations, the court determined Amburgy’s
alleged injury was not imminent because he failed to show if and/or when a
72. Id. at 1143.
73. Id. at 1142 (“[I]n the context of environmental claims, a plaintiff may challenge governmental action
that creates ‘a credible threat of harm’ before the potential harm . . . has occurred.”).
74. Id. at 1142–43.
75. Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007).
76. Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1143.
77. Infra Part II.B.
78. Amburgy v. Express Scripts, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1053 (E.D. Mo. 2009).
79. Id. at 1049.
80. Id. at 1048–49.
81. Id. at 1049.
82. Id.
83. Amburgy, 671 F. Supp. at 1050.
84. Id. at 1051.
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criminal would maliciously use his personal information. 85 Thus, the court
labeled Amburgy’s alleged injury speculative and uncertain, lacking the concrete
nature required for standing. 86 Therefore, the court dismissed the case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. 87
A similar breach of personal and financial information occurred in Reilly v.
Ceridian Corp., where the Third Circuit held that an increased risk of identity
theft was a hypothetical injury and therefore insufficient to confer standing. 88
There, Ceridian, a payroll company, stored social security numbers, birthdates,
and other sensitive information for its customers’ employees. 89 In December
2009, a hacker accessed the information of 27,000 employees.90 Later in October
2010, affected employees filed a class action suit against Ceridian for negligence,
contract, and breach of statutory violations. 91 Similar to Krottner, the plaintiffs
alleged an increased risk of identity theft, along with costs for monitoring their
credit.92 The district judge granted Ceridian’s motion to dismiss on the ground
the plaintiffs lacked standing. 93
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling. 94 The court
held that until the hacker used the personal information maliciously, “no misuse
of the information, and thus, no harm” occurred.95 Although the court recognized
future injuries can confer standing if they are imminent, it found the plaintiffs’
injuries were too conjectural to be imminent. 96 In particular, the court noted
future identity theft would depend on circumstances such as “if the hacker
attempt[ed] to use the information, and if he d[id] so successfully.” 97
The Third Circuit then criticized the “skimpy rationale” of the Pisciotta and
Krottner decisions.98 The Reilly court stated comparisons to environmental cases,
as done in Krottner,99 were inappropriate. 100 The court criticized these
comparisons because in environmental suits monetary compensation “may not
adequately return plaintiffs to their original position,” but data breach defendants

85. Id. at 1052.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1058.
88. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 40, 42 (3d Cir. 2011).
89. Id. at 40.
90. Id.
91. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., No. 10–5142, 2011 WL 735512, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 2011), aff’d, 664
F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2011).
92. Reilly, 664 F.3d at 40.
93. Id. at 41.
94. Id. at 46.
95. Id. at 42.
96. Id. at 43.
97. Reilly, 664 F.3d at 43.
98. Id. at 44.
99. Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 2010).
100. Reilly, 664 F.3d at 45.
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can easily recompense for identity fraud with monetary compensation. 101 With a
growing circuit split, the stage was set for the Supreme Court to lay down
guidance on the issue. 102
III. THE SUPREME COURT WEIGHS IN: CLAPPER AND SPOKEO
In 2013, the Supreme Court handed down a 5-4 decision in Clapper v.
Amnesty International USA.103 Although Clapper concerned constitutional
privacy, its effect on the standing doctrine had a large impact on data breach
cases.104 Section A discusses the Clapper opinion and its effect on standing
requirements.105 Section B discusses the Spokeo ruling and how it affected
standing rules.106
A. Clapper and the Strict Requirements for Standing
In 2008, Congress enacted the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 changing how
the government could surveil foreign individuals.107 Various individuals and
organizations, such as attorneys and human rights groups, challenged the law and
claimed it would subject their communications with foreign individuals to United
States government surveillance. 108 Those challenging the law made two
arguments regarding the injury required for standing: (1) the likelihood the
government would surveil their communications under the law, and (2) costs
spent to protect against government interception of communications. 109
At the district court level, the judge granted the government’s motion for
summary judgment, holding those challenging the law lacked standing. 110 The
Second Circuit reversed the district court, finding alleged future injuries
“sufficiently likely” to create standing. 111
After examining the prior decisions on the case, the Supreme Court turned to
the legal requirements for standing. 112 The Court reiterated its rule that “an injury
101. Id. at 45–46.
102. Infra Part III.
103. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013).
104. See Douglas Meal & David Cohen, How High Court’s Clapper Ruling Will Impact Breach Cases,
LAW360 (Mar. 5, 2013), https://www.law360.com/articles/420896/how-high-court-s-clapper-ruling-willimpact-breach-cases (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting the Clapper opinion will
likely help data breach defendants dismiss cases against them).
105. Infra Part III.A.
106. Infra Part III.B.
107. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 404.
108. Id. at 406.
109. Id. at 407.
110. Id.
111. Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 134 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 568 U.S. 398 (2013).
112. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409.
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must be ‘concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.’”113 Further, the Court
added that standing inquiries are “especially rigorous” when they involve
separation of powers or national security issues. 114 It then stated the injury must
be “certainly impending” to confer standing and that allegations of possible
future injury were insufficient. 115
Applying these requirements, the Court held the respondents’ first
argument—that the government was likely to surveil their communications—
relied on conjecture and possibilities, not enough to be certainly impending. 116
The opinion noted surveillance of respondents’ communications would require
the government to target respondents’ foreign contacts using the challenged
law.117 Thus, this potential series of events—labeled the “chain of
possibilities”—was too speculative. 118 The second theory—concerning the costs
spent protecting against government surveillance—was similarly insufficient
because respondents took measures to avoid a harm that was not certainly
impending.119 For these reasons, the Supreme Court reversed the Second
Circuit’s ruling. 120
In the opinion, the majority referenced another test for whether future harm
confers standing. 121 In certain cases, the Court has held the “substantial risk” that
harm will occur constitutes a sufficient injury. 122 However, the majority did not
fully explore the boundaries of this other standard, except to note respondents
would also fail under this standard because of the speculative nature of the
harm.123
The majority’s thorough discussion of how injuries must be “certainly
impending” for standing and the placement of the “substantial risk” standard in a
footnote identified “certainly impending” as the dominant rule. 124 Thus, the
Supreme Court highlighted a test with a “very strict” standard.125 This high
113. Id. (citing Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010)).
114. Id. at 408–09.
115. Id. at 409.
116. Id. at 410.
117. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 411.
118. Id. at 414.
119. Id. at 416.
120. Id. at 422.
121. Id. at 414 n.5.
122. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414 n.5.
123. See id. (“But to the extent that the ‘substantial risk’ standard is relevant and is distinct from the
‘clearly impending’ requirement, respondents fall short of even that standard, in light of the attenuated chain of
inferences necessary to find harm here.”).
124. See id. at 409, 414 n.5 (noting the discussion of certainly impending in the body of the opinion but
pointing to how substantial risk appears in a footnote).
125. Patrick Gallagher, Environmental Law, Clapper v. Amnesty International, USA and the Vagaries of
Injury-in-Fact: “Certainly Impending” Harm, “Reasonable Concern,” and “Geographic Nexus”, 32 UCLA J.
ENVTL. L & POL’Y 1, 1 (2014).
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standard poses a challenge for data breach plaintiffs potentially unaware of the
specifics of the breach, such as when the defendant worked to cover up the
breach.126 Additionally, under the Clapper standard, “certainly impending” harm
may require certain events, like the hacker making an unauthorized purchase with
the stolen information.127 Because Clapper deemed “speculative chain[s] of
possibilities” insufficient for an injury, 128 the case was problematic for data
breach plaintiffs.129
Now armed with this powerful tool, 130 data breach defendants effectively
used it to dismiss cases against them. 131 Although Clapper may have shifted the
scales toward data breach defendants, federal courts post-Clapper continued to
reach opposite conclusions on standing. 132 Thus, the stage was set for another
Supreme Court opinion. 133
B. Spokeo and the Failure to Resolve the Standing Issue
Amidst the ongoing standing question, in 2015 the Supreme Court granted
certiorari for Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins.134 Although it did not involve a data breach,
Spokeo concerned how statutory violations relate to standing and the type of
injury sufficient to confer standing. 135 Thus, the grant of certiorari led some to
believe the Supreme Court would put the data breach standing issue to rest. 136

126. See Gabrielle Orum Hernández, Uber’s Data Breach Cover-Up Strategy May Be More Common
Than You’d Think, CONN. L. TRIB. (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.law.com/ctlawtribune/sites/ctlawtribune/2017/
11/30/ubers-data-breach-cover-up-strategy-may-be-more-common-than-youd-think/ (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting data breaches often go unreported or are often covered up).
127. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011).
128. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414.
129. See Reilly, 664 F.3d at 42 (stating unless and until certain events occurred, the data breach plaintiff
had not suffered a harm).
130. Meal & Cohen, supra note 104.
131. Heidi J. Milicic, Standing to Bring Data Breach Class Actions Post-Clapper, AM. BAR ASS’N (Aug.
7, 2014), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/commercial/articles/summer2014 -0814-data-breachclass-actions-post-clapper.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting at the time of
the article’s publication virtually all data breach “defendant[s] asserting a Clapper-based challenge ha[ve] been
successful” in contesting standing).
132. See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding the increased
risk of harm from a data breach sufficient for standing); In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape
Data Theft Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 26 (D.D.C. 2014) (holding identity theft risk alone insufficient to confer
standing).
133. Infra Part III.B.
134. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/spokeo-inc-vrobins/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting the Supreme
Court granted the petition for certiorari on April 27, 2015).
135. Marcus A. Asner et al., Supreme Court Expected to Decide Soon Whether to Grant Certiorari in
Spokeo, LEXOLOGY (Apr. 15, 2015), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=9fd4a392-e4e2-471388c7-6d911829a69b (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
136. McNicholas & Nye, supra note 29.
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Spokeo, a consumer reporting agency, ran a “people search engine” which
generated profiles containing personal information about individuals. 137 Thomas
Robins accessed his own profile on Spokeo’s service and found inaccuracies. 138
He brought a class action suit against Spokeo under the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA) based on the incorrect information. 139 The district court dismissed the
case for lack of standing, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding the alleged
statutory violation sufficient to confer standing. 140
The Supreme Court addressed how statutes affect standing, noting Congress’
ability to make previously inadequate injuries adequate for standing purposes.141
However, not all statutory violations give rise to standing because the injury
needs to be particularized—that is, both individualized and concrete. 142 An injury
is concrete if it actually exists.143 The majority rejected the need for additional
harm beyond the harm Congress specified, but maintained a mere procedural
violation of a law is not enough. 144 The Court then remanded to the Ninth Circuit,
directing the Ninth Circuit to discuss the concreteness requirement. 145
Spokeo is relevant to data breach litigation because the case concerned the
type of injury necessary for standing. 146 Additionally, there is greater relevance
because data breach plaintiffs, similar to the Spokeo class, often claim statutory
violations.147 Like the plaintiffs in the Spokeo case, data breach plaintiffs may
allege standing under violations of the FCRA. 148 Therefore, the inability of a
procedural FCRA violation to confer standing may impact data breach cases
implicating the statute. 149
Despite Spokeo’s relevance to data breach lawsuits, the opinion did not
address the “certainly impending” test and contained minimal discussion of the
imminence requirement, limiting the opinion’s ability to put the standing
question to rest. 150 Therefore, although the Supreme Court issued an opinion on
137. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1544 (2016).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1546.
141. Id. at 1549 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992)).
142. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1549.
145. Id. at 1550.
146. Id. at 1548.
147. See Amburgy v. Express Scripts, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1049 (E.D. Mo. 2009) (noting the
plaintiff’s claims included “violations of ‘data breach notification laws’ of various States, and violations of
Missouri’s Merchandising Practices Act”).
148. See In re Horizon Healthcare Services Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 634 (3d Cir. 2017)
(“All four of the named Plaintiffs argue that the violation of their statutory rights under FCRA gave rise to a
cognizable and concrete injury.”).
149. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (indicating a bare procedural violation of a statute, without any other
harm, is not a sufficient injury).
150. See generally id. at 1540 (noting the court did not mention the “certainly impending” test and only
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standing, the data breach standing circuit split continues. 151
IV. THE CONTINUING CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER DATA BREACH STANDING AND A
SUPREME COURT SOLUTION
Though the Supreme Court handed down the Spokeo opinion in 2016, the
growing incidence of data breach litigation has since led to a sizeable circuit
split.152 Just as before Spokeo, the divide centers around whether the increased
risk of identity theft sufficiently confers standing.153 Section A discusses circuit
courts finding standing in data breach suits post-Spokeo and their reasoning. 154
Section B addresses a circuit court decision rejecting standing in a data breach
case post-Spokeo and its rationale. 155 Section C argues finding standing in data
breach suits is the better approach and why the Supreme Court should so hold.156
A. Recent Data Breach Cases Finding Standing
In 2016, the Sixth Circuit held the increased risk of identity theft, along with
costs expended to address the risk, a sufficient injury to confer standing. 157 In
Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., hackers breached Nationwide’s
databases and stole over a million customers’ personal information.158 In
response, affected customers spent time and money watching for identity theft. 159
Two of these customers brought separate class action lawsuits against
Nationwide for FCRA violations and alleged tort causes of action.160 The cases
were later consolidated, but the district court dismissed them holding the
plaintiffs lacked standing by failing to allege a cognizable injury or state a claim
for relief.161
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal. 162 Rather than focus on
Clapper’s “certainly impending” test, 163 the court used the “substantial risk”
standard.164 The court held the substantial risk of identity theft and fraud, along
briefly mentioned the “actual or imminent” standing requirement).
151. Infra Part IV.
152. Infra Parts IV.A–B.
153. Infra Parts IV.A–B.
154. Infra Part IV.A.
155. Infra Part IV.B.
156. Infra Part IV.C.
157. Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 388 (6th Cir. 2016).
158. Id. at 386.
159. Id. at 386–87.
160. Id. at 386.
161. Id. at 386–87.
162. Galaria, 663 F. App’x at 391.
163. Supra Part II.A.
164. Galaria, 663 F. App’x at 388.
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with mitigation costs, was a cognizable injury. 165 Addressing Clapper, the court
found no need to speculate about future injuries because hackers already had the
plaintiffs’ personal information. 166 Unlike Clapper, where the Supreme Court
found the government’s potential interception of plaintiffs’ communications too
uncertain,167 the Galaria court found the targeting of personal information
allowed for the reasonable inference the hackers would take malicious action. 168
Furthermore, the court distinguished Clapper by noting the imminence of the
identity theft. 169
A similar data breach affected the health insurer CareFirst and in the
resulting case the D.C. Circuit found the substantial risk of future harm sufficient
for standing. 170 Hackers accessed CareFirst’s database containing customer
information, such as names and social security numbers. 171 In the resulting class
action, plaintiffs made several claims including, negligence and breach of
contract.172 The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ case because neither a
present injury nor a likely future injury existed.173
The circuit court affirmed the validity of both the “certainly impending” and
“substantial risk” tests. 174 Using the latter test, the court found a substantial risk
of future harm arose when the hacker stole the sensitive information. 175 Similar to
the Galaria court, the Attias court noted how the plaintiffs presented a greater
risk of harm than in Clapper.176 Unlike the Clapper scenario, a hacker already
breached CareFirst’s database making the risk of future harm more substantial
and less speculative. 177 Finding a sufficient injury for standing, the court reversed
the dismissal.178
Another data breach lawsuit forced the Ninth Circuit to determine if its
holding in Krottner remained valid after Clapper.179 In In re Zappos.com, Inc.,
the court held Krottner to be reconcilable with Clapper.180 In Zappos, hackers

165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 411 (2013).
168. Galaria, 663 F. App’x at 388.
169. Id. at 389.
170. Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 622, 629 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
171. Id. at 622–23.
172. Id. at 623.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 626–27.
175. Attias, 865 F.3d at 629.
176. Id. at 628.
177. Id. at 628–29.
178. Id. at 630.
179. Hunton & Williams, LLP, Ninth Circuit Reverses District Court Decision in Zappos Consumer
Data Breach Case, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=4c33107bcaa1-4c32-8173-b70ec7768ff6 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
180. In re Zappos.com, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 888 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 2018).
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breached the defendant’s servers and allegedly obtained customers’ payment card
information and other personal information. 181 Several affected customers filed
class action lawsuits claiming inadequate protection of their personal
information.182 After consolidating the suits, the district court held the plaintiffs
lacked allegations of actual identity theft.183 Thus, the plaintiffs did not have
standing and the district court dismissed their suits.184
The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal on appeal. 185 Similar to the courts in
Galaria and Attias, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the “certainly impending”
standard in Clapper but used the “substantial risk” standard instead. 186 In holding
Krottner valid, the court noted Krottner did not involve “national security or
separation of powers concerns” and therefore the standing analysis was less
rigorous than in Clapper.187 With Krottner as precedent, the court held the
plaintiffs’ substantial risk of identity theft or fraud was a sufficient injury to
confer standing. 188 While the Sixth, D.C., and Ninth Circuits found standing from
the risk of identity theft post-Spokeo, the Fourth Circuit rejected plaintiffs’
standing based on the same risk.189
B. A Recent Data Breach Case Not Finding Standing
The Fourth Circuit held the increased risk of identity theft stemming from a
data breach too speculative to confer standing in Beck v. McDonald.190 A laptop
containing personal information for thousands of patients went missing from a
Veterans Affairs hospital.191 An investigation deemed it likely stolen. 192 Two
patients brought a class action lawsuit alleging negligence and statutory
violations.193 At the district court level, the judge held the risk of future identity
theft and measures protecting against that risk inadequate for standing. 194
On appeal, the circuit court considered the uncertainty of whether a thief took
the laptop to commit identity theft and the lack of actual identity theft
allegations.195 Therefore, the court held a risk of future harm insufficient for
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
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Id. at 1023.
Id.
Id. at 1024.
Id.
In re Zappos.com, 888 F.3d at 1030.
Id. at 1024, 1029.
Id. at 1026.
Id. at 1029.
Infra Part IV.B.
Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 275 (4th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 267.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 268.
Beck, 848 F.3d at 274.
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standing because that harm was speculative. 196
Unlike some other circuit courts, 197 the Beck court used statistics in its
holding.198 Specifically, the plaintiffs asserted that 33% of affected patients
would fall victim to identity theft, a percentage the court determined too small a
figure to meet the “substantial risk” test.199 Time and money spent on protective
measures, such as credit monitoring services, failed to confer standing because
the patients took these steps in response to a speculative threat. 200
This growing circuit split identified by Beck201can lead to negative
consequences, such as forum shopping; therefore, federal courts should use a
singular approach to data breach standing. 202
C. The Better Approach to Standing
The circumstances in data breach cases differ, including whether a thief stole
payment card information or more sensitive data, such as social security
numbers.203 However, in all of these cases the end result is often the same—
confidential information is now vulnerable and likely in the hands of criminals. 204
These data breaches can lead to severe penalties and prison time for hackers. 205
Because of the serious consequences, criminals likely do not break into databases
without reason. 206 These hackers commonly sell the stolen information on the
internet where the information may be bought to commit identity theft or
fraud.207 Considering these circumstances, the Supreme Court should adopt a rule
establishing increased risk of identity theft and fraud as a sufficient injury for
standing under the “substantial risk” standard. 208
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id.
Supra Part IV.A.
Beck, 848 F.3d at 275–76.
Id.
Id. at 276–77.
Id. at 273–74.
COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM STRUCTURE AND
INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 13 (1975), reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195, 218 (1975).
203. See, e.g., In re SuperValu, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 870 F.3d 763, 766 (8th Cir.
2017) (noting criminals hacked the defendant’s computer network and gained access to customers’ credit and
debit card information); Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 631–32 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating a hacker
breached the defendant’s database containing data including customers’ social security numbers).
204. See Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 623 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (noting an intruder hacked into
defendant’s computers and accessed a database containing the personal information of customers).
205. Christopher Coble, What Are the Criminal Penalties for Hacking?, FIND LAW (Feb. 2, 2016),
http://blogs.findlaw.com/blotter/2016/02/what-are-the-criminal-penalties-for-hacking.html (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (indicating federal hacking statutes often carry 10-year prison sentences).
206. See id. (indicating fines and prison sentences for violations of hacking laws).
207. Selena Larson, What Cybercriminals Do with Stolen Social Security Numbers, CNN (Sept. 19,
2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/09/19/technology/business/equifax-breach-social-security/index.html (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
208. Daniel Bugni, Note, Standing Together, An Analysis of the Injury Requirement in Data Breach
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In formulating this rule, the Supreme Court should take a similar stance as
the Seventh Circuit in Remijas and consider why hackers targeted the database.209
“Why . . . would hackers break into a store’s database and steal consumers’
private information? Presumably, the purpose of the hack is, sooner or later, to
make fraudulent charges or assume those consumers’ identities.” 210
Courts often reference the “speculative chain of possibilities” in Clapper211
when denying standing on the basis of future harm in data breach cases. 212 The
Clapper respondents alleged an injury requiring five contingent events before the
harm occurred. 213 Unlike Clapper, hackers have often already accessed a
database with personal information in data breach cases and now possess the
sensitive data. 214 The hacker, or another criminal, need only maliciously use that
stolen information for the identity theft or fraud to occur. 215 Thus, only one event
needs to happen for the harm to arise. 216 This, along with the likely reason
criminals hack databases,217 presents not a “speculative chain of possibilities,”
but a plausible result that substantially increases the risk of identity theft or
fraud.218
Despite Clapper’s focus on the “certainly impending” test, 219 federal courts
have discretion in analyzing future injuries under either the “certainly
impending” test or the “substantial risk” test. 220 Therefore, the Supreme Court
should clarify that the “substantial risk” test applies to data breach cases. 221

Class Actions, 52 GONZ. L. REV. 59, 90 (2016). But see Megan Dowty, Note, Life Is Short: Go to Court:
Establishing Article III Standing in Data Breach Cases, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 683, 702 (2017) (noting
compensating data breach plaintiffs on the basis of increased risk of identity theft would require speculation).
209. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015).
210. Id.
211. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 (2013).
212. See Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 275 (4th Cir. 2017) (finding the future harm of identity theft
would not occur unless a “chain of possibilities” happened).
213. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 410.
214. See Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 623 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (noting an intruder hacked into
defendant’s computers and accessed a database containing the personal information of customers).
215. See Ricardo Villadiego, The Equifax Data: Now That They Have It, How Will Hackers Use It?”,
FORBES (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2017/11/29/the-equifax-data-nowthat-they-have-it-how-will-hackers-use-it/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (indicating
after data breach criminals will likely use stolen private information to commit identity theft).
216. See id. (stating after data breach hackers will likely use stolen personal data to perpetrate identity
theft).
217. See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015) (stating the likely
purpose of hacking a database is to maliciously use the private information).
218. See Attias, 865 F.3d at 629 (finding a substantial risk of identity theft when intruders hacked into a
database with confidential information).
219. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409, 414 n.5 (2013) (noting the discussion of
certainly impending in the body of the opinion but pointing to how substantial risk appears in a footnote).
220. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014).
221. See id. (noting the “certainly impending” and “substantial risk” tests are both used for future
injuries).

444

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 50
Unlike Clapper, data breach cases do not involve national security or separation
of powers issues, making the standing inquiry less rigorous. 222 This less rigorous
inquiry means the “substantial risk” test is appropriate for data breach cases. 223
Because a breach of private information creates a substantial risk of identity
theft, the Supreme Court should hold data breaches of personal information
constitute a sufficient future injury for standing. 224
Application of the “certainly impending” test could still allow for standing as
seen in In re Adobe Systems, Inc. Privacy Litigation.225 In data breaches, hackers
steal personal information to use it for criminal purposes; therefore, the
likelihood of identity theft or fraud is much greater than the harm in Clapper.226
Unlike Clapper, no speculation is needed to find hackers have already taken the
plaintiff’s personal information. 227
Steps taken to protect against a hypothetical or speculative future harm are not
considered an adequate injury.228 However, the Supreme Court should consider
holding the costs expended to safeguard against identity theft resulting from data
breaches as a sufficient injury because data breaches of private information
create more concrete risks of harm229 In lieu of a Supreme Court ruling, a statute
could also resolve the data breach standing issue. 230
V. A STATUTORY SOLUTION
A statutory solution may cure the data breach standing issue by specifying an
individual’s interest in the confidentiality of his or her personal information and
exposure of the information in a data breach harms this interest. 231 Section A
discusses how statutes can establish standing.232 Section B provides the language

222. In re Zappos.com, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 888 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 2018); see
also Case Comment, Standing—Challenges to Government Surveillance—Clapper v. Amnesty International
USA, 127 HARV. L. REV. 298, 298 (2013) (“[T]he ‘certainly impending’ standard . . . should only be applied to
litigants challenging governmental action in foreign affairs or national security.”).
223. See In re Zappos.com, 888 F.3d at 1029 (applying the “substantial risk” test to data breach
litigation).
224. See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting a substantial
risk of harm when hackers breached a database and stole private information).
225. In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1215 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
226. See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693 (stating hackers presumably hack into databases to use the personal
information for identity theft or fraud).
227. In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1214–15 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
228. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 416 (2013).
229. See Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (finding a substantial risk of
identity theft when intruders hacked into a database with confidential information).
230. Infra Part V.
231. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Congress has the
power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none
existed before.”).
232. Infra Part V.A.
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of a proposed statute. 233 Section C addresses the advantages of a statutory
solution.234
A. Statutes and Standing
While the standing doctrine is constitutionally rooted,235 statutes can be
relevant to determine whether standing exists in a case.236 “The actual or
threatened injury required by Article III may exist solely by virtue of ‘statutes
creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.’” 237 Additionally,
“Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that
will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before.” 238 Thus,
Congress can make previously inadequate injuries sufficient for standing. 239
In In re Horizon Healthcare Services Inc., the Third Circuit held alleged
violations of statutory rights under the FCRA were sufficient injuries for
standing.240 There, a thief stole two laptops containing the personal information,
including Social Security numbers, of a health insurer’s customers. 241
The Third Circuit found “Congress established that the unauthorized
dissemination of personal information by a credit reporting agency causes an
injury in and of itself.” 242 The court’s determination rested on how Congress
established a private right of action in the FCRA and the harm to be prevented by
the law closely related to invasion of privacy, a traditional basis for lawsuits.243
Thus, the Third Circuit held the alleged FCRA violations sufficient for standing
purposes.244
In Spokeo, the Supreme Court indicated Congress could elevate concrete
injuries into an injury-in-fact for standing. 245 Furthermore, the Court stated
intangible injuries or the risk of real harm could meet the concreteness

233. Infra Part V.B.
234. Infra Part V.C.
235. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492–93 (2009).
236. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
237. Id. (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D, 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973)).
238. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
239. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578). An example
includes the Clean Air Act’s granting of a procedural right to protect a person’s concrete interests. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 7607(b)(1) (West 2018); Mass. v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 517–18 (2007).
240. In re Horizon Healthcare Litigation Services Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 635 (3d Cir.
2017).
241. Id. at 630.
242. Id. at 639.
243. Id. at 639–40.
244. Id. at 640.
245. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 578 (1992)).
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requirement.246 Data breaches bring the risk of real harm by identity theft or fraud
to those affected.247 Even though there is only a risk of harm and the exposure of
personal information is intangible, data breaches can create concrete injuries that
satisfy the concreteness requirement.248 Thus, Congress could enact a statute to
elevate the concrete injury, exposure of personal information in data breaches, to
an injury-in-fact.249 With guidance from cases like Spokeo and In re Horizon
Healthcare Services Inc., a statute could confer standing in data breach cases. 250
B. Proposed Statutory Language
The following is the text of a proposed statute to end the data breach standing
circuit split, taking language and influence from California’s data breach
notification law. 251 California’s law serves as a strong starting point because it
was the first data breach notification law in the United States and has served as a
model followed by other states.252 Additionally, multiple amendments over the
years to California’s data breach notification law means the law is still up-to-date
and can act as a model for the proposed statute.253
(a) A person has an interest in maintaining the confidentiality of his
or her personal information. 254
(b) The interest in the confidentiality of personal information is
harmed when the personal information is exposed in a data
breach in accordance with subdivision (c).255

246. Id.
247. See In re Zappos.com, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 888 F.3d 1020, 1027 (9th Cir. 2018)
(“[T]he information taken in the data breach . . . gave hackers the means to commit fraud or identity theft.”).
248. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (noting intangible injuries can be concrete and the risk of real harm
can satisfy the concreteness requirement).
249. See id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992)) (“Congress may ‘elevat[e]
to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.’”).
250. Infra Part V.B.
251. See generally CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (West 2018) (noting the law’s provisions to serve as a
model for the proposed statute).
252. See Brandy L. Worden, Understanding California’s Data Breach Notification Law: Protecting Your
Company & Customers, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 11, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a18fee34
-e1cb-4993-9e6c-d98fcd86f6e9 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“California became the
first state to enact its Data Breach Notification Law. This law has become a model that has been followed by
many states across the United States.”).
253. See id. (indicating the California Legislature has amended the California data breach notification
law over the years, with the most recent changes taking effect in January 2017).
254. See generally In re Zappos.com, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 888 F.3d 1020, 1027 (9th
Cir. 2018) (noting the sensitivity of the information stolen in a data breach and how the exposed information
“gave hackers the means to commit fraud or identity theft”).
255. See generally id. (discussing the sensitivity of the information stolen in a data breach and how the
exposed information “gave hackers the means to commit fraud or identity theft”).
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(c) The harm in subdivision (b) arises if: 256
(1) the personal information was stored unencrypted, or 257
(2) the personal information was stored encrypted, but the
encryption key or security credential was, or is
reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an
unauthorized person. 258
(d) A person experiencing the harm in subdivision (b) may, either at
law or in equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue the
individual or business maintaining the database that experienced
the data breach.259
(e) A person bringing an action under this section against an
individual may recover only the actual expenses, if reasonable
under the circumstances, incurred as a result of the data
breach.260
(f) A person bringing an action under this section against a business
employing less than 100 employees may recover only the actual
expenses, if reasonable under the circumstances, incurred as a
result of the data breach. 261
(g) A person harmed under this section shall be entitled to freeze
their credit with credit reporting agencies at no cost within one
year of the disclosure of the data breach. 262
(1) The costs to freeze credit under subdivision (g) shall be
paid for by the individual or business maintaining the
database that experienced the data breach. 263
(2) For purposes of subdivision (g), “credit reporting
agencies” means the following credit reporting agencies:

256. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a) (West 2018).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77k(a) (West 2018).
260. See generally A.J. Dellinger, Americans Spent $1.4 Billion on Credit Freezes After Equifax Breach,
MSN (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/markets/americans-spent-dollar14-billion-on-creditfreezes-after-equifax-breach/ar-BBKzDIZ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“Americans
spent an estimated $1.4 billion on credit freezes in the wake of the massive data breach at credit reporting
company Equifax.”); Jessica Vomiero, Small Businesses Often More Vulnerable to Cyberattacks, Experts Say,
GLOBAL NEWS (June 30, 2017), https://globalnews.ca/news/3567122/petya-ransomware-cybersecuritybusinesses/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting the limited financial resources of
small businesses to defend against cyberattacks and deal with the consequences of one).
261. See generally Dellinger, supra note 260 (“Americans spent an estimated $1.4 billion on credit
freezes in the wake of the massive data breach at credit reporting company Equifax . . . .”); Vomiero, supra note
260 (noting the limited financial resources of small businesses to defend against cyberattacks and deal with the
consequences of one).
262. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(d)(2)(G) (West 2018).
263. Id.
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Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion. 264
(h) For purposes of this section, “data breach” means the
unauthorized access and acquisition of computerized data
containing personal information. 265
(i) For purposes of this section, “personal information” means: 266
(1) A person’s first name or first initial and last name in
combination with one or more of the following: 267
(A) Social security number. 268
(B) Driver’s license number.269
(C) Account number or credit card or debit card
number.270
(D) Medical information. 271
(E) Health insurance information. 272
(2) A user name or email address, in combination with a
password, or security question and answer, that would
permit access to an online account. 273
Through the adoption of a statute like the proposed solution, Congress could
end the data breach standing circuit split. 274
C. Advantages of a Statutory Solution
While a Supreme Court ruling could put the standing issue to rest, a federal
statute would offer some benefits.275 The statute would have to advance through
the deliberative legislative process. 276 This legislative process lets stakeholders

264. See LaToya Irby, Who Are the Three Major Credit Bureaus?, THE BALANCE (Oct. 10, 2017),
https://www.thebalance.com/who-are-the-three-major-credit-bureaus-960416 (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review) (noting Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion are the three major credit reporting agencies in
the United States).
265. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(g) (West 2018).
266. Id. § 1798.82(h).
267. Id. § 1798.82(h)(1).
268. Id. § 1798.82(h)(1)(A).
269. Id. § 1798.82(h)(1)(B).
270. CIV. § 1798.82(h)(1)(C).
271. Id. § 1798.82(h)(1)(D).
272. Id. § 1798.82(h)(1)(E).
273. Id. § 1798.82(h)(2).
274. See supra Part IV (noting the circuit split over standing in data breach litigation).
275. See Mank, supra note 53, at 1365 (stating Congress could pass a law providing better remedies for
data breach litigants).
276. See VALERIE HEITSHUSEN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, INTRODUCTION TO THE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE U.S. CONGRESS 1–2 (2018), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42843.pdf
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (summarizing the process legislation must go through to
become law).
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and interested parties publicly discuss the bill’s provisions, which would allow
the statute to best reflect the realities of privacy and database security.277
A Supreme Court ruling would apply a single standing test to all data breach
defendants.278 This could prove harmful for small businesses that may lack
resources to take the protective measures instituted by larger companies.279 Thus,
the statute would limit liability for individuals and small business owners. 280 By
limiting liability for smaller businesses, the statute would encourage these
businesses to guard against data breaches while not being overly burdensome. 281
In addition to resolving the standing question, the law could address
remedies as well. 282 Affected individuals may take protective measures against
data breaches, such as freezing their credit or signing up for credit monitoring
services.283 Therefore, affected people may have to spend money to protect
against identity theft and fraud. 284 Recognizing these costs, the statute would
provide individuals affected by a data breach the opportunity to freeze their credit
free of charge with credit bureaus. 285 The business controlling the database, such
as Neiman Marcus in the Remijas case, would pay for the credit freezes. 286 Thus,
the statute would provide a measure of compensation to those impacted by data
breaches without resort to the courts. 287
VI. CONCLUSION
Data breaches are an increasingly common occurrence and can lead to

277. See id. at 3–4 (stating committees may hold hearings on bill in which the interested parties may
discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the bill).
278. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409, 414 n.5 (2013) (noting the discussion of the
“certainly impending” test and “substantial risk” test).
279. See Andrew Zaleski, Congress Addresses Cyberwar on Small Businesses: 14 Million Hacked Over
Last 12 Months, CNBC (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/05/congress-addresses-cyberwar-onsmall-business-14-million-hacked.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting small
businesses often cannot afford to have IT departments).
280. Supra Part V.B.
281. See supra Part V.B (proposing a statute which would limit liability for small businesses).
282. See Mank, supra note 53, at 1365 (stating Congress could pass a law providing better remedies for
data breach litigants).
283. Brian Fung, After the Equifax Breach, Here’s How to Freeze Your Credit to Protect Your Identity,
WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/09/09/after-theequifax-breach-heres-how-to-freeze-your-credit-to-protect-your-identity/ (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
284. See Kayleigh Kulp, Credit Monitoring Services May Not Be Worth the Cost, CNBC (Nov. 30,
2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/29/credit-monitoring-services-may-not-be-worth-the-cost.html (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting credit monitoring services can cost $30 a month).
285. Supra Part V.B; Irby, supra note 264.
286. Supra Part V.B.
287. See id. (proposing a statute under which individuals and businesses controlling databases would pay
for credit freezes for affected individuals in the event of a data breach).
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consequences, including identity theft and fraud. 288 Like all other plaintiffs,
individuals attempting to sue for a data breach in federal court must have
suffered an injury sufficient to confer standing. 289 In data breach cases, plaintiffs
may try to sue on the basis of the increased risk of identity theft due to identity
theft not yet occurring. 290 However, whether this is a sufficient injury may
depend on which court hears the lawsuit.291
Circuit courts have continued to diverge over whether the future risk of
identity theft is sufficient for standing purposes. 292 However, courts finding the
future risk sufficient take the better approach because criminals hack databases to
sell the stolen personal information or use it to commit other crimes; therefore,
the risk of identity theft is not speculative. 293 Thus, the Supreme Court should
adopt a rule that the future risk of identity theft or fraud due to a data breach is a
sufficient injury for standing. 294
Alternatively, Congress could resolve the data breach standing issue with a
statute.295 A data breach law would have certain advantages over a Supreme
Court decision, such as the flexibility to compensate affected individuals before a
lawsuit.296 With either the Supreme Court issuing a decision or Congress passing
a statute, the circuit split would finally end and give certainty to data breach
plaintiffs and defendants. 297

288. Supra Part I.
289. Supra Part II.
290. Supra Part I.
291. Supra Part II.
292. Supra Part IV.
293. Supra Part IV.C.
294. Id.
295. Supra Part V.
296. Supra Part V.C.
297. See supra Part II; Part IV (noting how similar data breach plaintiffs may experience different
outcomes based on the court).
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